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COMMENT
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW - PERSONAL LIBMTY AND SECURITY -
THE RIGHT OF LOCOMOTION
T HE CONTINUING effort of American municipalities to work out
ordinances which provide the maximum in security and pro-
tection for the public usually takes concrete shape in the enactment
of vagrancy or curfew laws designed to restrict disorderly or cri-
minal elements engaged in anti-social activities. Ordinarily such
enactments are merely reasonable excercises of the police power
inherent in all effective municipal governments. Occasionally,
however, such ordinances appear to raise serious questions, parti-
cularly where they are susceptible of construction in such a way
that they appear to infringe upon constitutional liberties.
An example of such an ordinance may be found in City of Port-
land v. Goodwin,' in which the Supreme Court of Oregon upheld,
against the defense that it abridged the defendants' right of loco-
motion,2 an ordinance which made it unlawful for any person to
roam or be upon any street between the hours of 1 and 5 a.m. with-
out having and disclosing a lawfull purpose. The right invoked by
the defendants is one which is not commonly thought about3 and
its application with respect to curfew, vagrancy and kindred regula-
tions has caused considerable divergence of opinion among the
courts.4 Since arrests under such ordinances constitute a large
portion of the arrests made by the police,' it is obvious that a
problem of more than theoretical importance is presented.
SCOPE OF REGULATIONS BY MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
It has been repeatedly pointed out that no liberties are absolute,6
and that individual rights must often in specific cases give way to
the overriding need for order and law. 7 But the precise extent to
which the inherent police powers of the state can be used to restrict
individual rights is an open question in many fields. Indeed, no
2"210 P.2d 577 (Ore. 1949).
2-Id. at 580.
:See Murray, Book Review, 26 N.D. Bar Briefs 208, 209 (April, 1950).
SVagrancy ordinances have long been a sore spot in the law, Lisle, Vagrancy Law: Its
Faults and Their Remedy, 5 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 498 (1914); Note, 23 Calif. L.
Rev. 506 (1935), and it is widely recognized that the social conditions which originally
brought about their enactment have materially changed. Note, 23 Calif. L. Rev. 506
(1935). There are very few cases dealing with the legality and permissible scope of curfew
regulations for minors.
'See Note, 23 Calif. L. Rev. 506 (1935).
Hall, Free Speech in War Time, 21 Col. L. Rev. 526,529 (1907).
Wickersham, The Police Power, A Product ot The Role of Reason, 27 Harv. L. Rev.
297 (1914).
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authoritative or generally accepted definition of the term, "police
power," has ever been formulated. The extent to which the police
power can be used to restrict the right of locomotion, i.e., the right
of citizens to come and go as they please, has been considered by the
courts very few times.
Certain principles are fundamental. The common use of the
streets is far more than a license. 8 In the leading case of Pinkerton
v. Verberg,9 the Michigan court laid down what appears to be the
best statement of the general rule, in affirming a judgment for the
plaintiff recovered in a suit for false arrest by a police officer:
"One may travel along the public highways or in public places,"
said the court, "and while conducting themselves in a decent and
orderly manner, disturbing no other, and interfering with the right
of no other citizen, there they will be protected under the law not
only in their persons, but in their safe conduct." 10
In Ex parte McCarver,"' a Texas court held invalid an ordinance
which prohibited minors from remaining on the streets after 9 p,m,
on the ground that iti was an undue invasion of personal liberty,
pointing out that the rule laid down by the ordinance was "paternal-
istic" and "as rigid as military law." This case, however, has been
criticized by a California court, which upheld an ordinance making
it a crime for any person having custody or control of any minor
under 18 years of age to allow the minor to "remain or loiter"
upon any street or public place in Los Angeles between 9 p.m. and
4 a.m. "12 The California court observed that, "If the McCarver case
can be interpreted to prevent the enactment of any regulatory
curfew legislation whatsoever, which we seriously doubt, it is
out of step with the great weight of authority dealing with the
right of legislative bodies to pass laws properly necessary for the
regulation of minors." 13
The cases dealing with the power of municipalities to restrict
the use of the streets by immoral or disorderly persons are not in
s Freund, Police Powers §165 (1904).
918 Milch. 573, 44 N.W. 579 (1889) where arrest of plaintiff was made on suspicion by an
officer who believed the arrested woman to be a streetwalker, although she was traveling
along the street in normal fashion.
'Old. at 44 N.W. 582.
."39 Tex. Crim. App. 448, 46 S.W. 936 (1898). The argument of the Texas court
in Ex parte McCarver that such a curfew ordinance was "paternalistic" would probably
not be accepted today.
12"People v. Walton, 70 Cal.App.2d 862, 161 P.2d 498 (1945) which appears to be
grounded primarily upon the right of the legislature to control minors.
.. Id. at 161 P.2d 502. Ex parte McCarver was distinguished on the ground that the
California ordinance did not restrict the right of the minor to go upon the streets, but
only from "remaining or loitering upon such street," and that the Texas ordinance was
different in legal effect. The McCarcer decision proceeded on the theory that the legislature
had no more power to control minors than it had to control adults. If one accepts this
premise, however, the decision appears to be sound as a matter of constitutional law.
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accord. An ordinance prohibiting any woman from entering a liquor
establishment or from standing within fifty feet of such a building
has been held void as an unreasonable interference with individual
liberty,1 4 as has an ordinance forbidding any person from appearing
on the street improperly attired - for example, in a bathing suit. 5
In Dunn v. Commontpealth 16 an ordinance was upheld prohibiting
prostitutes from being on the streets between certain hours. Yet a
number of cases have reached results apparently in conflict with
this decision. Ordinances forbidding association with disorderly or
immoral persons have been held invalid, on the ground that the
criminal law may not intervene until a positive breach of the law is
reached, or the act of the accused is such as to justify an implici-
tion of an intended breach of the law. 7 The South Dakota court
said in City of Watertown v. Christnacht,18 a case dealing with
such an ordinance, that to sustain such an ordinance ". . . would
prevent personal effort on the part of male citizens to ameliorate
the condition of fallen women." -
As defined by subsequent decisions, the right of locomotion is
interfered with when city officials prevent union officials from
coming .to a city to hold meetings, 20 or when a state requires a
person engaged in hiring laborers for work outside the state to pay
a tax in order to engage in such an occupation.2 1 The opinion in
the last case in a broad dictum indicated that "undoubtedly the
right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another
according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and
the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory
', Gastenau v. Commonwealth, 108 Ky. 473, 56 S.W. 705 (1901) (ordinance failed to
distinguish between moral and immoral women).
'5 People v. O'Gorman, 274 N.Y. 284, 8 N.E.2d 862 (1937).18 105 Ky. 834, 49 S.W. 813 (1899). But cf. Gastenau v. Commonwealth, 108 Ky. 473,
56 S.W. 705 (1901); People v. O'Gorman, 274 N.Y. 284, 8 N.E.2d 862 (1937). The
Dunn case does not appear to be authority for the ordinance sustained in the principal
case, since it is undisputed that the legislature or municipality may forbid prostitution
completely, as well as regulate it.
17 City of St. Louis v. Fitz, 53 Mo. 582 (1873).
s39 S.D. 290, 164 N.W. 62 (1917).
19 Id. at 164 N.W. 62.
0 C.I.O. v. Hague, 25 F.Supp. 127 (D. N.J. 1938). No state has the power to punish
a criminal for coming from another state to it by reason of the fact that he had committed
a crime in the former. See United States v. Miller, 17 F.Supp. 65, 67 (W.D.Ky. 1936). And,
of course, any citizen has the right to pass freely from state to state. Crandall v. Nevada, 6
Wall. 35 (U.S.1867). Hillborn v. Briggs, 58 N.D. 612, 226 N.W. 737 (1929) involved
an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a woman resident of North Dakota who had
been taken into custody and confined at the county poor farm in Stutsman county on the
ground that she was properly a resident of Minnesota. North Dakota laws at that time
permitted the removal of paupers to their proper place of residence. The court granted the
writ on the ground that the statutes did not purport to allow a person to be removed
from the state, but did not determine whether a removal from one county to another in
North Dakota could be accomplished over the protest of the person affected. The case
came up for discussion at the 1949 meeting of the North Dakota Bar Association. See
Proceedings, 26 N.D. Bar Briefs 112-113 (1950).
21 See William v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
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of any state is a right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and
by other provisions of the Constitution." 22
VAGRANCY STATUTES
Probably the commonest restriction on the right of free movement
is found in the vagrancy statutes. In their inception, these statutes
were designed mainly to place the burden of supporting the poor
on the home parish." Yet it was recognized as early as 1914 that
the laws of a medieval island country such as England where
these statutes were originally adopted, were poorly fitted to condi-
tions in the United States, 24 and the result has been that the com-
mon law definition of vagrancy - i.e., that a vagrant was a person
who wandered about from place to place, subsisting on charity,
without any visible means of support, and not working although
able to do so,25 - has now largely given way to statutory defini-
tions which are considerably more inclusive.2 6 A good many vag-
rancy statutes today permit punishment for conduct which is simply
immoral, 27 contrary to the accepted mores of society,-2 8 or ordinarily
prohibited by other statutes.29 It has been argued that vagrancy
ordinances are of the nature of public regulations to prevent crime,
rather than ordinary criminal laws.30 The Virginia court has quot-
ed with approval the view that, " if the condition of a person brings
him within the description of either of the statutes declaring what
persons shall be esteemed vagrants, he may be convicted and im-
prisoned, whether such condition is his misfortune or his fault. His
own individual liberty must yield to the public necessity or the pub-
lic good." 11 Such an approach is obviously subject to criticism on
the ground that so construed, vagrancy statutes simply penalize pov-
erty.
Cases construing statutory definitions of vagrancy have laid
down several basic principles. Mere idleness 32 or associations
2Id. at 274.
"Lisle, op cit. supra, note 4.
24 Ibid.
"In re Jordan, 90 Mich. 3, 50 N.W. 1087 (1892); Ex parte Strittmatter, 58 Tex. Cr.
156, 124 S.W. 906 (1910); State v. Grenz, 26 Wash.2d 754, 175 P.2d 636 (1947).
"See such cases as People v. Belecastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N. E. 401 (1934); State
v. Grenz, supra note 17.
People v. Scott, 113 Cal. App. 77 8, 296 Pac. 601 (1931) (presentation of obscene
theatrical entertainment).
2Jackson v. City of Dennen, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P.2d 240 (1942) (cohabitation of
Negro and White persons as husbnad and wife under common law marriage). But cf. Perez
v. Lippold, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948), 25 N.D. Bar Briefs 212 (1949).
"State v. Hagen, 130 S.W. 250 (Mo. 1939) (non-support of family).
30Morgan v. Commonwealth, 168 Va. 731, 191 S.E. 791 (1937).
a Id. at 191 S.E. 793.
nEx parte McCue, 7 Cal. App. 765, 96 Pac. 110 (1908). An emergency statute re-
quiring every able-bodied man to work at least 36 hours a week has been held unconstitu-
tional. Ex parte Hudgins, 86 W.Va. 526, 103 S.W. 327 (1920).
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with persons of unsavory character is not enough to constitute vag-
rancy. 33 It has been established that a person cannot be convicted
of vagrancy because of what he is "reputed to be" 34 or because he
loiters in barrooms,' 5 although if he loiters in such places without
a lawful means of support, he may be convicted.3 6  It has been
pointed out further that it would be impracticable under vagrancy
laws to ". . . punish, or even to forbid, improper intentions or pur-
poses; for with mere guilty intention unconnected with overt act or
outward manifestation, the law has no concern." 37 The early rule
was that there must be a coexistence of at least two factors in the
same person - wandering and the possession of no visible means
of support - before a person could be convicted.38
In more recent cases, the close interrelationship of the vagrancy
laws and the curfew statute upheld in City of Portland v. Goodwin
may be illustrated by referring to the Washington case of State v.
Grenz,35 which upheld a conviction of vagrancy because the de-
fendant was found wandering about late at night under suspicious
circumstances without reference to his livelihood or vocation. The
dissenting opinion might have been written for the Portland case:
"The legislature has not the constitutional power to define as a
crime the wandering about the streets at late and unusual hours of
the night without being engaged in a visible or lawful business.
Have we traveled so far along the highway to regimentation that
an officious officer may accost a citizen at any time of the day or
night and insist upon that citizen answering impertinent questions
33Ex parte Smith, 135 Mo. 223, 36 S.W. 628 (1896). Here a vagrancy statute was
held unconstitutional which prohibited association with other persons of unsavory
character. A conspiracy statute would be constitutional, but one which controls a person's
associations is not. ". . . Human laws and agencies have not yet arrived at such a degree
of perfection as to be able, without some overt act done, to discern and to determine by
what intent or purpose the human heart is actuated. . . . it would be wholly impractible
for human laws to punish, or even to forbid, improper intentions or purposes; for with
mere guilty intention, unconnected with overt act or outward manifestation, the law has
no concern."
34People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 401 (1934).
15Ex parte Branch, 234 Mo. 466, 137 S.W. 886 (1911). Cf. Taylor v. Sandersville, 118
Ga. 63, 44 S.E. 845 (1903) which upheld an ordinance making it penal to idle, loiter,
or loaf upon streets.
w In re Stegenga, 133 Mich. 55, 94 N.W. 385 (1903). That a person is not a vagrant
because he wanders around without visible means of support, see In re Jordan, 90 Mich.
3, 50 N.W. 1087 (1892). To a different effect, See Ex parte Karnstrom, 297 Mo. 384,
249 S.W. 595 (1923), which declared a statute constitutional that made any person who
tramped about without any lawful means of support a vagrant, with vagrancy not necessarily
being of a continuous nature or status. But that a necessary element of vagrancy is its
continuing nature, see Ex parte Tom Wong, 122 Cal.App. 672, 10 P.2d. 797 (1932);
Ex porte Oates, 91 Tex. Crim. 79, 238 S.W. 930 (1921).
37Ex parte Smith, 135 Mo. 223, 36 S.W. 628 (1896).
3823 Calif. L. Rev. 506 (1935).
n 26 Wash.2d 754, 175 P.2d 636 (1947).
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of the officer? Does wandering create a presumption of an unlaw-
ful purpose?" 
4 0
SUMMARY
In summation, the Portland ordinance appears on the facts and
reasons presented by the Oregon court, to constitute an unreason-
able infringement on personal liberty. The common use of the
streets is far more than a license extended by the municipality or
the state. It is a constitutional right, which can be abridged only
so far as absolutely necessary for the protection of other citizens.4 1
Blackstone defined personal liberty as the "... power of locomo-
tion, of changing situation or moving one's person to whatever
place one's inclination may direct without imprisonment or re-
straint, unless by due course of law." 42 The concept of liberty has
changed radically since the days of Blackstone and the drafting of
the Constitution, if citizens today can be arrested simply because
they refuse to submit to police questioning when they choose to
use the streets.
10 Id. at 175 P.2d 639. A California court has pointedly said that it is within the legislative
power to define vagrancy to include ". . . those who indulge in pointless, useless wandering
from place to place within a state, without any excuse for such roaming other than the
impulse generated by what is sometimes denominated wanderlust. Ex Porte Cutler,
1 Cal.App.2d 273, 36 P.2d 441 (1934).
'l Freund, Police Powers §86 (1904). The court in the Portland case indicated "That
crimes of lust and violence are generally committed under the cloak of darkness is judicially
known. We find that the ordinance bears a reasonable relation to the evil at which it is
directed." It has been indicated that the usual presumption supporting statutory validity is
not applicable to laws restricting guaranteed civil liberties. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1945); 40 Col. L. Rev. 531 (1940).
4' 1 B1. Comm. *134-135, discussed in Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term
"Liberty" in Those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions which Protect "Life,"
Liberty, and Property, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 365, 377 (1891). Historically, the right of locomotion
is protected by Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which specifies that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. When
the phrase, "life, liberty, or property," was included in the Fourteenth Amendment, it was
intended to provide to the citizen as against the states the same protection which had been
given as against the Federal Government by the Fifth Amndment, which contains the
identical phrase. See Hebben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310, 325 (1903); Greenle v. Barber
Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 329 (1901); Warren, The New Liberty Under the
Fourteenth Arendment, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 431, 439 et seq. (1926). But the phrase has
a much older history than that. Shattuck gives it an origin in the Teutonic law, with a
possible earlier derivation from the laws of the Franconian and Saxon Caesars. Shattuck,
supra, at 369. The clause appears in Anglo-Saxon law at the beginning of the Thirteenth
century in the Magna Charta, which provided in Article 39: "No freeman shall be taken
or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or banished, or any ways destroyed, nor will we
pass upon him, nor will we send upon him, unless by the lawful judgment of his peers,
or by the law of the land." A confirmatory statute of a slightly later date enlarged
this section by adding after the word "disseised" the words "of his freehold, or liberties,
or free customs." It was this provision, paraphrased into the "life, liberty, or property"
clause, which was inserted in our Constitution. Shattuck, supra, at 372. As used in this
clause, the word "liberty" did not have the broad scope which it possesses today. It meant
simply personal liberty, the right of locomotion. Shattuck, supra, at 376. The way in which
the Fourteenth Amendment has been broadened by the Supreme Court to include such
liberties as freedom of speech and religion has been carefully traced by Charles Warren.
See Warren, supra.
